THE MILITARY ASCENT INTO SPACE: FROM PLAYGROUND TO
BATTLEGROUND-THE NEW UNCERTAIN GAME IN THE HEAVENS
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Control of space will be decided in the next century. If the Soviets control space, they can control earth, as in the past
. . . the nations that controlled the seas dominated the continents.2[John F Kennedy (1960)]
Strategic vision is a rare phenomenon and exposes one to ridicule and skepticism. The early proponents of air and
armored warfare had their detractors and skeptics before World War II validated their theories. Today, there is a new
frontier, one that needs to be approached with vision and innovation if a nation is to prevail and survive
independently and freely . . . space, the new frontier.3 [Major Elek J Szkalak (1988)]
The mastery of outer space will be a requisite for military victory, with outer space becoming the new commanding
heights for combat, . . . lightning attacks and powerful first strikes will be more widely used in the future.4 [Captain
Shen Zhongchang, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (2001)]

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Soviet Union led the way in conquering space in the 1950s through
a series of initiatives that included satellites, launch of spacecrafts and nuclear detonations. In
October 1957, man conquered space with the launch of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union. In the
same year, the United States successfully undertook nuclear detonations in space.5 Four years
later, the Soviet Union launched the first manned spaceflight when it placed Yuri Gagarin into
orbit. The United States followed suit in 1962. These activities effectively marked the start of a
technological race between the United States and Soviet Union with each seeking dominance in
space exploration marking the genesis of a space race which would soon metamorphose into an
arms race. As the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union grew
in intensity, the military utility space offered was not lost on the sea-faring nations. Research and
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development of state-of-the-art technology to capitalize on the utility of outer space got
underway.
The international community was quick to generate rhetoric that states should use outer
space for positive and peaceful purposes. A 1957 General Assembly resolution dealing with the
topic of disarmament declared that “the sending of objects through outer space shall be
exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.”6 A year later, U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 1348 recognized that the common aim of humankind was that outer space was to be
used “for peaceful purposes only.”7 The United States and Soviet Union obliged with the United
States adopting the view that:

“[P]eaceful” in relation to outer space activities was interpreted…to mean “non-aggressive” rather
than non-military…By contrast, the Soviet Union publicly took the view, despite its own military
uses of space, that “peaceful” meant “non-military” and that in consequence all military activities
in outer space were “non-peaceful” and possibly illegal.8

This divided sentiments by the two superpowers, the vanguard in the development of customary
law on the matter, meant that despite general international sentiment championing nonmilitarization of space, the looming space arms race on the horizon had powerful “patrons”.
The mastery of outer space as the basis of integrated battleground platforms is fast
becoming a reality. As the two Gulf Wars and the Kosovo military campaign made clear, space
assets are decisive in battle planning and execution. As the 21st century unfolds, several decades
after man’s conquest of space, the increasing global reliance on space systems and an increasing
militarization of space and its weaponization, its evolution into a distinct theatre of military
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operations is a matter of time. The worrying thing from the author’s perspective is that when the
reality of space warfare dawns, there will be a serious legal deficit in the absence of specific
international norms restricting the use of means and methods of war in space. State practice as it
currently exists offers no insights into how the law will be applied. Space law is patchy with
regard to militarization and weaponization of space. On one hand the provisions of its key
instruments offer broad interpretational leeway for and against the militarization and
weaponization of space, while on the other hand, cyber warfare itself sits uneasily within the
U.N. Charter on the regime on the use of force in light of the Charter drafters’ almost singular
fixation on conventional land, air and sea warfare.
This article seeks to bring to light the various aspects pertaining to the militarization and
weaponization of space.9 It will give an overview of initiatives by the space-faring nations in
developing space weaponry, discuss the space law regime and in particular expose its defects in
effectively addressing space warfare. It will then proceed to generally juxtapose space warfare
with the U.N. Charter regime on the use of force. The article exposes various questions, but does
not seek to undertake the ambitious goal of supplying solutions; after all, as the article will
demonstrate, the problems are readily evident, but the solutions absent.

II. DEVELOPING COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN SPACE: FROM SCIENCE FICTION
TO MILITARY UTILITY
Despite the various prohibitions spelt out in declarations, proclamations and treaties, the
United States and Soviet Union actively sought to harness the military capabilities offered by the
9
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weaponization of space through development of offensive and defensive weaponry. During the
late 1950s and early 1960s several air-launched anti-satellite weapons (A.S.A.T.) systems were
tested by the United States and Soviet Union as a counter weight to each other’s development of
strategic air-launched and satellite-dependent ballistic missiles.
The United States initially led the way in exploring and researching innovative
technology to develop military space plane technologies and a viable military space plane base.
These efforts include:

[T]he first Aerospaceplane program and Dyna-Soar/X-20 program (late 1950s-early 1960s); X15 hypersonic and X-24 lifting body flight test programs (late 1950s through early 1970s);
Advanced Military Space Flight Capability (AMSC), Transatmospheric Vehicle (TAV), and
Military Aerospace Vehicle (MAV) concept and mission studies (early 1980s); the Copper
Canyon airbreathing single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) feasibility assessment and the National
Aerospace Plane (NASP) program (1984-1992);…and, most recently, the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization’s Single-Stage Rocket Technology program that built the Delta ClipperExperimental (DC-X) experimental reusable spaceplane.10

The Soviet Union was not to be outdone by the United States. It actively pursued
development of anti-satellite weapons.11 By the 1970s, the Soviet Union had succeeded in
developing an explosive kill vehicle with the ability to be “hoisted” into the same orbital plane as
a target satellite. In addition, development of electromagnetic and radiation weapons with the
capacity to impair electronic circuitry by the creation and/or emission of electromagnetic pulse
(E.M.P.) was actively underway and yielding exciting results. Technological breakthroughs were
turning scientific dreams into military utility.12

10

GlobalSecurity.org, Military Spaceplane, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/msp.htm.
A.S.A.T.s are a form of “hard kill” weapon which entails steering the weapon close to the target and detonation in
the vicinity to cripple the target. Through the 1960s, the Soviet Union wrestled with the technology and engineering
necessary to bring into operation working A.S.A.T.s.
12
This was manifest in the suspicious “blinding” of three United States satellites by an intense beam of radiation
emanating from the western part of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1975. Christopher M. Petras, The Use Of
Force In Response To Cyber-Attack On Commercial Space Systems—Re-examining “Self-Defense” In Outer Space
11

4

In the early 1970s to mid-1970s, a period of détente set in, marginally easing the arms
race between the two superpowers. This brief period of optimism and cooperation resulted in the
signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties.13 However, as
this period withered away, a renewed focus on space weaponry took over, leading then United
States President Gerald Ford to sign the National Security Decision Memorandum No. 345
(N.S.D.M.-345) on January 18, 1977. N.S.D.M.-345 directed the Department of Defense
(D.o.D.) to develop operational A.S.A.T. capability, while continuing to study arms control
options for anti-satellite weapons.14

The argument behind the policy was both logical and persuasive: the prospect of a United States
ASAT capability would serve as a “bargaining chip” that would provide the Soviet Union with
real incentive to negotiate and give the United States leverage once talks began, and, in the event
negotiations failed, the United States would acquire the capability to deal with military threats in
space.15

When Jimmy Carter stepped into the White House on Ford’s departure, he embraced the
Ford administration’s “two-track” schizophrenic policy. On one hand, his administration sought
to develop an operational United States A.S.A.T. capability; on the other hand, it pursued an
agenda of limiting development of anti-satellite weapons by the Soviet Union. On May 11, 1978,
Carter issued his own space policy through Presidential Directive (P.D./N.S.C. 37).16 It strongly
mirrored that of the Ford administration and offered no significant new dimensions. Echoing the
Ford administration’s basic principle, it noted: “Purposeful interference with operational space
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systems shall be viewed as an infringement upon sovereign rights. The United States will pursue
activities in space in support of its right of self-defense.”17
Three years later, Carter was out of office and the bellicose Ronald Reagan the new
occupant of the White House. Under Reagan, a significant shift in space policy was to take place.
In 1981, the first year of the Reagan presidency, the new administration initiated a
comprehensive space policy review geared towards exploring ways of generating a United States
military capacity to weaponize space. Amidst the review, the Soviet Union introduced the
prevention of an arms race in outer space into the agenda of the thirty-sixth General Assembly in
the fall of 1981.18 The Soviets proposed the conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the
Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space.19 The General Assembly was receptive to
the Soviet initiative and expressed the view that it “considered it necessary to take effective steps,
by concluding an appropriate international treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer
space.”20 However, the initiative was received a lukewarm approach and was soon dead without
mourners or honor.
In 1982, the results of the Reagan administration’s comprehensive space review were
presented in National Security Decision Directive No. 42 (N.S.D.D. 42), issued on July 4, 1982.21
Its key theme reiterated that contained in the previous Ford and Carter administrations—the
United States considered the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of
passage through space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems would be
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viewed as infringement upon sovereign rights. 22 It was, however, the D.o.D. space policy issued
a few days later that signaled a significant shift in policy. It heralded the development of an
A.S.A.T. capability for the primary purpose of “[deterring] threats to [the] space systems of the
United States and its allies.”23 A year later, it was “gloves-off” time when Reagan launched the
Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.) on 23 March 1983. Reagan delivered what became “known
as ‘The Star Wars Speech’ in which he proposed using technological advances to develop an
effective non-nuclear missile defense program to counter missiles launched by attackers.”24 In it
he further announced the ambitious military goal of the United States to “embark on a program to
counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive.”25 The focus of the
S.D.I. program was to intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached
continental United States.26 The S.D.I. was a system geared to use space-based systems to protect
the United States from attack by strategic nuclear missiles. The “Star Wars” initiative gave the
cooling space arms race a renewed boost.27
The S.D.I received an added boost in July 1982 when the Reagan Administration released
the “Defense Guidance” directive which unabashedly proclaimed that “the United States will
pursue activities in support of its right to self-defense.”28 It offered a five-year plan in which
space operations would “add a new dimension to our military capabilities.”29 The directive also
ordered “the prototype development of space-based weapons systems so that [the U.S.] will be
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prepared to deploy fully developed and operationally ready systems should their use prove to be
in [its] national interest.”30
With the S.D.I. in place and Reagan’s militaristic mindset, billions of dollars were
splashed on various military projects, mainly innovative technologies to bolster the military
might of the United States. The United States was keen to develop and introduce futuristic
weapons, including beam, kinetic, electronic, and laser weapons into the space environment.
There was however considerable debate over the necessity, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of
such weapons. The huge military expenditure did pay dividends. Among its major successes was
the flight in September 13, 1985 by United States Air Force pilot Major Doug Pearson. He made
military history when he successfully displayed the capabilities of A.S.A.T. weapons:

From his F-15A flying at Mach1.22 200 miles west of Vandenberg AFB, he executed a 3.8 g 65
degree climb to launch a missile, which destroyed a satellite called P78-1. The target satellite
was orbiting at 345 miles above the Pacific Ocean. The target satellite was kinetically destroyed,
shattered into space debris.31

Pearson’s feat provided credence as well as a propaganda base for the Reagan
administration’s “Star Wars” vision, signaling a new phase in the arms race in outer space. The
successful flight provided just the sort of evidence that proponents of the weaponization of space
needed. It was evident that a robust, well-funded space program would be able to develop
workable technologies.
Even as the Reagan administration was turning the heat up with its ambitious space
militarization and weaponization vision, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) was working to address the matter of weaponization of space anhd in
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particular to head off the looming space arms race between the two superpowers. In its report
issued at the end of its 1985 session, COPUOS acknowledged the differing viewpoints by
member states as to the extent to which the Committee could engage in substantive work toward
the peaceful maintenance of outer space.32 The COPOUS initiative was among a series of
international initiatives in the shadow of the “Star Wars” program aimed at curtailing the Reagan
administration’s gung ho mindset towards outer space.
Three years after the COPOUS meeting, in 1988 the General Assembly passed a
resolution supporting general and complete disarmament under effective international control.33
Resolution 43/70 stated that in order for disarmament to take place, outer space must be used for
peaceful purposes and must not become an arena for a new arms race.34 “The General Assembly
recognized the need to consolidate, reinforce, and enhance the legal regime in outer space, and to
provide effective verification measures. The vote on the resolution was 154 to 1: the United
States cast the single negative vote.”35 The prevention of an arms race in outer space was once
again at the heart of the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament composed of both
developed and developing world countries when it convened for its 520th plenary meeting in
1989. Delegates called for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The general sentiments
of the meeting are captured in Indian Ambassador Sharma’s declaration that:

[I]t is accepted that an extension of the arms race into outer space would have profoundly destabilizing
consequences. Deeply conscious of such risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the
United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures
aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.36
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However the differing viewpoints among some members and the political shadow cast by the
reluctant superpowers prevented any definitive agenda emerging in relation to preventing
weaponization of outer space, something which may perhaps have put a brake on the Reagan
administration's “Star Wars” vision and thrown cold water on Soviet determination to match and
counter the Reagan administration’s ambitious program.
By 1989, the Reagan policy of “A.S.A.T. deterrence,” and the corresponding goal of
developing and deploying anti-satellite capability, were reaffirmed and entrenched as part of
United States military policy with the introduction of National Space Policy Directive No.1
(N.S.P.D. 1) by the George Bush Sr. administration. The move to ensure effective global power
projection through space supremacy received added urgency a year later, in 1990, when the first
Gulf War demonstrated the multiplier effects that space technology would have on military
capabilities.
The article now turns to consider the impact that the first Gulf War had on United States
space policy. It was the first war to rely heavily on space technology and the first to demonstrate
that an integrated battle platform coordinated through space assets would contribute
tremendously to battleground supremacy. The net result in subsequent years was to spur the
United States to aggressively pursue research and development of innovative space weapons and
in particular the development of Space Operated Vehicles (S.O.V.s) with the capability of
delivering and deploying ordnances from space through low-earth orbit (L.E.O.), geosynchronous orbit (G.E.O.) or sun-synchronous orbit (S.S.O.).

10

III. THE FIRST GULF WAR: “DWARFING” THE ENEMY THROUGH SPACE
SUPREMACY
The first Gulf War (“Operation Desert Storm”) heralded the beginning of a great era of
the space age.37 “It’s the first space war,” declared a space policy analyst.38 Coalition forces,
which included the largest naval fleet constituted since World War II, were supported by “the
most sophisticated information network ever designed…dwarfing anything generated in previous
wars.”39 An impressive array of technologies, and particularly the use of satellites and other
outer-space mounted devices, was on display. The United States displayed that space technology
would be harnessed to coordinate land, sea and aerial military assets to produce a holistic
integrated battle platform. The “Smart War” featured lightening attacks targeting Iraqi command
and control targets,40 and “microwave” technology targeting and jamming Iraqi communications
facilities.41 The future was now here.
The experience of the Gulf War in which the United States suffered light casualties
despite facing a battle-hardened Iraqi Army and the role that technology played in enabling its
control of the battlefield buoyed United States determination to enhance its military capabilities
through technology. The heavy reliance on satellites convinced the United States military that
“space dominance and space control” were necessary.42
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It was not lost on the Pentagon that while the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force
(A.E.F.) can bring to bear weighty ordnance from heavy bombers, its long cycle time between
missions, particularly if traveling from continental United States, posed a logistical nightmare
with possession of few overseas bases exacerbated by the frequent denial of over-flight rights.
This tended to restrict missions or force military command into alternative plans. These
shortcomings meant that the United States was forced to rely heavily on the Navy’s Carrier Battle
Groups (C.V.B.G.) to take up missions. However, the C.V.B.G. had their own problems, mainly
the time taken to reach the operational area, the expense of cruise missiles, the limited number of
available cruise missiles and their limited ability to strike mobile or heavily fortified targets.
Six years after the experiences of the first Gulf War, then United States President Bill
Clinton issued his national space policy. In part, it carried on the general tenor of United States
space policy stretching back to the Ford years. It reiterated the requirement that space was to be
used for “peaceful purposes.” However, it contained a robust reaffirmation of the shift in policy
that had been spawned by Reagan. It championed the interpretation that the term “peaceful” does
not exclude military activity such as intelligence-gathering or even armed defense.43 The policy
went on to note the military utility of space asserting that “peaceful purposes” encompassed
defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals.44 Two
years later, Clinton’s National Security Strategy asserted that “[US] policy is to promote
development of the full range of space-based capabilities in a manner that protects our vital
national security interests.”45 Two significant reasons may be attributed to this strong pro-

Quoted in Bruce K. Gagnon, Pyramids to the Heavens: The Coming Battle for Control and Exploitation of Space, in
48 TOWARD FREEDOM 1 (Sept./Oct. 1999), available at http://www.towardfreedom.com/1999/sep99/spacewar.htm.
43
National Science and Technology Council, National Space Policy 3 (Sept. 19, 1996), at
http://ast.faa.gov/licensing/regulations/nsp-pdd8.htm (emphasis added).
44
Id.
45
A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House, Office of the President 1998) at 25 (emphasis
added).

12

military stance. First, since the first Gulf War, the United States had been pursuing development
of space air vehicle systems and the United States Air Force’s dream of a responsive Military
Space plane—the S.O.V.—was firming up as a reality as a result of major technological and
engineering breakthroughs.46 Secondly, there was a military worry that the new heavy reliance on
space was creating significant vulnerabilities to United States’ military operations.47
In 2001, Clinton exited the White House and George Bush Jr. took over the reins. While
the Clinton administration had advocated a robust space policy, Clinton (in the tradition of the
Democrats) had demonstrated disinclination towards a heavy military spending binge. Bush Jr.,
however, showed no such caution. In line with former Republican president, Ronald Reagan, he
revived and adopted a bellicose, hard-line stance based on the notion that America’s interests
were underwritten by military might, and thus the need to not only maintain America’s
supremacy but to eclipse every other nation. Technological breakthroughs in the 1990s had
brought to the fore the fact that the heavens would not only be conquered but ruled. Shrugging
the protest of the international community, the Bush Jr. administration dusted off Reagan’s S.D.I.
and brought it back to play with the embrace of the so-called “Son of Star Wars”.
In 2001, a Commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld—a space weaponry fanatic—
reported to Congress after a comprehensive space review. The report warned that the 600
satellites the United States military depends upon for photo reconnaissance, targeting,
communications, weather forecasting, early warning and intelligence gathering were highly
46
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vulnerable to attack from adversaries.48 The report went on to caution that the United States must
anticipate a “Space Pearl Harbor”—a crippling sneak attack against American satellites orbiting
the planet.49 To reduce the nation’s vulnerability, the Rumsfeld Commission urged the
government to develop “superior space capabilities,” including the ability to “negate the hostile
use of space against United States interests” by using “power projection in, from and through
space.”50 With the Bush Jr. administration pledging to pursue a national missile defense system,
Rumsfeld’s vision was to guarantee dominance of space by eliminating threats to America’s
satellites.51 Rumsfeld noted that from history every medium—air, land and sea—had seen
conflict. In essence, contemporary reality indicates that space will be no different.52 The report
from his Commission rounded off by calling space warfare “a virtual certainty.”
It was not just the Americans who were seeing space warfare as a virtual certainty in the
future. The first Gulf War had convinced China’s military leadership of the importance of hightech warfare and the ability of sophisticated space-based command, control, communications, and
intelligence systems to link land, sea and air forces.53 The growing importance of space in future
warfare left the Chinese with no choice but to take note of United States military efforts to ensure
future space dominance. With Russia a washed out power lacking the financial resources to keep
up the “toe to toe” space arms race with the United States, China as an aspiring superpower has
been quick to join the game.
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IV. CHINA-A NEW CHALLENGER STEPS FORWARD: THE DRAGON LOOKS UP
TO THE HEAVENS
Having watched the United States harness the effectiveness of an integrated battleground
platform underpinned by space technology and weaponry in the first Gulf War, Chinese defense
analysts recognized that space control provides the key to military victories in modern warfare.
As a consequence, China has in recent years been concentrating on sharpening its military power
through incorporation of technology geared toward a leaner and efficient technologically driven
military. This is in part due to five factors.

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

the technical and professional reforms of the 1980s which sought to de-politicize the military
allowing it to focus more robustly on its core business—effective warfare capability.54
the learning experience from the use of space technology by the United States in both Gulf Wars
and Kosovo.
an awareness that the benignly labeled Japanese Self-Defense forces of its chief competitor in Asia
have a serious technological edge.55
the Bush Jr. administration’s push to implement a national ballistic missile shield and significantly
the potential provision of this technology to Taiwan in an atmosphere of increased tension between
the tiny island state and mainland China.
its aspirations to superpower status, helped in no small measure by the vacuum created by the
break-up of the Soviet Union, its chaotic and inept transition to free market economy that has
hamstrung it economically resulting in a significant decay of its military capabilities.

In view of the factors outlined above, it was not surprising that in 2003, a Chinese military
official declared: “In the current and future state security strategy, if one wants not to be
controlled by others, one must have considerable space, scientific and technological strength.
Otherwise one will be bullied by others.”56
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China’s position as a space power was cemented with the successful launch of its first
manned spaceflight into the earth’s orbit on February 15, 2003. China became only the third
nation to achieve the feat. In tandem with this, it has undertaken an active role in sharpening its
war fighting space skills, from creating anti-satellite weaponry, building new classes of heavy-lift
and small boosters, as well as improving an array of military space systems. It is no secret that
China has long harbored long-term plans to launch its own space station, and possibly a reusable
space plane as well. While one of the strongest immediate motivations for this program appears
to be political prestige, China’s manned space efforts are almost certainly geared to contribute to
improved military space systems.57
Publicly, China “declares that space should not be militarized and that space technologies
should be used for peaceful purposes.”58 This stance mirrors the sentiments of the other major
space-faring states. Similar to the United States and the former Soviet Union, the Chinese
rhetoric is clearly at odds with the military considerations driving its space program. The Chinese
space program’s mid-term objectives include creating an integrated military earth observation
system, building satellite broadcasting and telecommunications system59 and fielding a
constellation of space-based reconnaissance systems with real-time intelligence capabilities.60
Keen to bolster its electronic “eyes and ears”:

In the booster department, China is proceeding with building a new modular family of heavy-lift
launchers. Additionally, a new small, solid-propellant space lifter is being developed. A family
of these smaller boosters would provide China the ability to hurl small satellites into orbit. This
57
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class of booster would give China a rapid launch capability, “and has broad military, civil, and
commercial applications.” 61

China has been busy procuring state-of-the-art technology to improve its intercept,
direction finding, and jamming capabilities. China is also on a path toward developing directascent A.S.A.T. system. A Pentagon report in 1998 warned that “given China’s current level of
interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon that
could destroy satellites in the future.”62 This was no idle warning: “in 1999, the Chinese
displayed a portable laser weapon, advertised for blinding human vision and electro-optical
sensors highlighting a potential acquisition of high-energy laser equipment that could be used in
the development of ground-based A.S.A.T. weapons.”63 Despite the Communist regime’s
traditional aversion to transparency, China seems to have also developed satellite tracking radar,
as well as anti-G.P.S. jamming technology.64
The next part of the article conducts a brief tour de horizon of the space law regime. It
does not seek to analyze the regime in full; rather, it will confine itself to an overview of
international initiatives that have had a somewhat direct bearing on the weaponization and
militarization of space. The international instruments in question are the 1963 Limited Test Ban
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Treaty,65 the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,66 the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (A.B.M. Treaty)67
and the first Strategic Arms Reduction (S.A.L.T.) Treaty.68

IV. A NEW CALCULUS-SPACE LAW: MANAGING AN EXTRA-TERRESTIAL WILD
WEST
In the late 1950s, states maintained the view that outer space should be used for
“peaceful” purposes. However, the disagreement was whether this meant “non-military” or “nonaggressive uses,” especially considering the fact that the then-dominant players—the two
superpowers—were actively engaged in harnessing the military utility offered by space and were
thus averse to a strict definition. The space regime as it now exists rests upon five United Nations
treaties on outer space. These treaties evolved from a series of General Assembly resolutions and
declarations following the creation of the Outer Space Committee in 1959.69
The development of a legal regime to govern space was kick-started in 1963 with the
adoption of the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing State Activity in the Exploration and
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Use of Outer in late 1963 by the United Nations General Assembly.70 It was the “first significant
step in the development of space law”.71 In the same year that the Declaration on Legal Principles
was adopted, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under
Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)72 entered into force to address the contested and controversial
issue of nuclear detonations in space. The treaty primarily aimed to limit nuclear weapons testing
but was also a reaction to Soviet pleas that nuclear detonations posed a danger to the safety of its
cosmonauts.73 Though the United States responded to the Soviet concern with the assurance “that
no activities were contemplated which could have harmful effects upon the Soviet spacemen,”74
the international community nonetheless felt it imperative that nuclear detonations be totally
banned. With the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, nuclear detonations in space
were no longer lawful.75 In addition, the treaty establishes three significant implications for space
warfare. These are eloquently synthesized by Major Robert A. Ramsey:

1.

2.
3.

First, while the treaty prohibits all nuclear detonations in space, even those that may have
value for peaceful military or scientific purposes, it does not regulate detonations of a nonnuclear nature.
Second, because the treaty outlaws ‘any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion’, it may prohibit the use of nuclear fission as a means of space propulsion.
Finally, the Treaty also prohibits the use of nuclear explosions for non-testing purposes as
well.76
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The treaty’s singular focus on nuclear detonations was a sign of its time. Little thought
and attention seems to have been put into ensuring that the treaty effectively prevented space
from being turned from a sanctuary of “peaceful” science into a battleground that may one day
offer opportunities for offensive and defensive non-nuclear weapons. First, the ban focuses
exclusively on nuclear weapons, meaning that other forms of weapons such as conventional,
biological, chemical, or high energy laser weapons can be deployed without breaching the treaty.
Second, to the extent that nuclear power sources operate by means other than explosion, the
treaty does not prohibit their use. This off course means that the testing and deployment of nonnuclear based A.S.A.T.s and S.O.V.s with combat capabilities are technically not covered by the
treaty.
Four years after the entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space
Treaty entered into force. This treaty has been termed the “Magna Carta of outer space law.”77
The major principles governing activities in space are presented in Articles I, II and III of the
Outer Space Treaty. Article I states that activities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be conducted for the benefit of all countries and that outer space shall be
part of the heritage of all mankind.78 It also provides for freedom of scientific investigation in
outer space and for international cooperation in such investigation.79 Article II provides that
nations cannot appropriate outer space by claim of sovereignty.80 Article III provides that states
parties to the Treaty will conduct their activities in space in accordance with international law,
the United Nations Charter, and in the interest of international peace, security, cooperation and
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understanding.81 Of significance with regard to the use of force is Article III’s reference to
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and in particular its express preservation of the right of
states to use space in self-defense.
The most relevant provisions regarding weaponization of space are Articles IV and IX.
Article IV provides:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The moon and
other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful
purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any
type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.
The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not
be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the
moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.82

The language in the provision above specifically refers to the limitation of nuclear weapons or
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction from being placed “in orbit around the earth ...
install on celestial bodies ... nor station in outer space in any manner.”83 This language refers to
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction specifically and not to peaceful purposes
generally. In this regard, Anderson notes that “Article IV (1) is viewed by most commentators as
only a limited disarmament provision.”84 The phrase “weapons of mass destruction” is generally
accepted to include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.85 This essentially means that the
weapons of mass destruction provision does not apply to conventional weapons , nor does it
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apply to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.86 Evidence that the drafters only intended
Article IV (1) to ban orbiting nuclear-type weapons is the drafters’ agreement that the Treaty
does not prohibit the stationing of land-based ICBMs, even though their flight trajectory would
take them through outer space.87 It is well established that the only specific limitation placed on
the use of the outer void space for military purposes is that found in Article IV (1).88 Professor
Cheng asserts that “the outer void space as such can be used for any military activity that is
compatible with general international law and the Charter of the United Nations, so long as no
“nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction are stationed there.”89 The
practical import of this analysis is captured in Anderson’s observation that:

Under this…interpretation, none of the exotic future weapons systems currently being proposed or
researched by the United States would violate this provision of the Outer Space Treaty. For instance, laser
beam weapons are intended to destroy their targets by delivering a high impulse shock that causes
structural collapse of the rocket booster or by remaining on the target until a hole is burned through the
missile… violations would only occur if any of the weapon systems included a nuclear explosion to propel
them or as a means of destroying a target.90

Alongside the specific reference the restriction of only particular weapons, Article IV is
the setting for much greater controversy. It provides for two separate legal regimes for military
activity in outer space: (1) activity conducted on the moon and other celestial bodies, and (2)
activity conducted in outer space itself. Article IV divides the extraterrestrial universe into three
parts: the Earth’s orbit, celestial bodies, and outer space. This then means that the Outer Space
Treaty does not completely free all of outer space from military use. Military activity by its
86
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terms, including deployment of the A.S.A.T., is prohibited specifically on the moon and other
celestial bodies. Outer space, as such, remains open to military activity that is non-aggressive, in
line with the United Nations Charter, international law as long as such activity does not involve
nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Professor Bin Cheng notes that subject to the
second paragraph in article IV, “nothing in article IV (1) itself prohibits the stationing of any
other type of weapons in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, or in fact the
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, for military purposes in any
other way.”91
From the foregoing paragraphs, it can be deduced that Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty contemplates the military use of space for scientific research and grants a carte blanche to
civilian scientific applications. The reality is that civilian applications of space capabilities such
as weather, navigation, communications and remote sensing are equally significant for military
purposes. In addition, as a technical matter, there is no bright line between military “missiles”
and civilian “space launch vehicles.” Technologies used to build sophisticated weaponry are
often similar or even identical to the technologies required for civilian space programs. “The
differences relate to intentions, not capabilities.”92
The tacit acceptance of military usages coupled with the explicit permission to civilian
endeavors provides a strong argument that militarization of space through placement of nonnuclear and other weapons of destruction is in and of itself permissible under the space law
regime. The argument then moves to whether the acceptance of space militarization under this
interpretation permits the deployment of offensive and defensive capabilities in space in a variety
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of respects. Pursuing this line of argument further, a military-biased interpretation of article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty would seem to provide for the possibility of space combat in a variety of
respects. It provides, in part: “States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States
Parties to the Treaty.”93 The provision, like Article IV and for that matter most key space law
provisions, makes no distinction between military and civilian activities. Based on this lack of
clarity, and depending on the interpreter, the provision would apply fully to military operations in
space. In any case, the United States has imported a military-oriented view in interpretation by
maintaining that all States possess the inherent right to defend against foreign aggression in outer
space, as well as within earth’s atmosphere.94 As Professor A. Vlasic notes:

If one chooses to ignore the controversy concerning the “true” meaning of “peaceful” in the
Outer Space Treaty, it is safe to conclude that the Treaty permits the deployment in outer space
of anti-satellite weapons, directed energy weapons, or any other kind of weapon, as long as these
weapons are not in conflict with the prohibitions of Article IV [such as weapons of mass
destruction in orbit] of the Outer Space Treaty, or some other international agreement. 95

As militarization of space gained momentum, in the early 1970s, détente slowed down the
arms race opening a new window of opportunity for the superpowers which led to the signing of
twosignificant treaties —the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (A.B.M. Treaty) and the first Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) Treaty. Both these treaties tacitly recognize the legality of
reconnaissance satellites as a means of verifying treaty compliance, and prohibit any
“interference” with their function.96 The provisions are no surprise since consensus was that
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positive activities in space included, but were not limited to, the use of military satellites to
monitor the performance of arms-control agreements. Two primary provisions of the A.B.M.
Treaty have a direct bearing on the weaponization of space — articles V and XII.
Article V (1) provides that “[e]ach party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”97
Though there were no space-based A.B.M. systems in existence in 1972 when the treaty was
adopted, the space program of each Party was highly advanced and each could foresee the use of
space-based A.B.M. systems.98 Article XII is perhaps even more significant to the long-term use
of space by military systems beyond the narrower question of A.B.M. systems:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each
Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent
with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the
other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.99

Paragraph 1 is significant. Though the legality of military surveillance activity from space
was established in international law previous to the A.B.M. Treaty, the treaty gave formal
sanction to the practice by the two leading space-faring states. In particular it acknowledged the
legality of space-based surveillance via satellite and entrenched this as “an essential component
of the international arms control regime.”100 Thus, while the term “peaceful” is contained in all
U.N. documents devoted to outer space matters, Richard A. Morgan notes that most experts agree
that the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit “military use” of space.101 He goes on to note that
there is a “consensus, within the United Nations that ‘peaceful’ more specifically equates to ‘non97
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aggressive.’”102 However the general stance by commentators noted by Morgan is at odds with
the Conference on Disarmament’s observation in 1986 that “[n]o country should develop, test or
deploy space weapons in any form.”103
In sum, despite the use for peaceful purposes centerpiece of the space law regime, key
provisions readily lend themselves to interpretations that would support many aspects of
militarization and weaponization of space. The matter is thus open and dependent on what
perspective a state adopts since it can readily stretch the elastic nature of the space law regime to
fit its particular analysis.
The article now turns to juxtapose weaponization of outer space and the U.N. Charter
regime on the use of force. The snapshot offered demonstrates the legal and interpretation muddle
that confronts the international community with interpretations possible both ways depending on
the interpreter demonstrating a lack of clarity or perhaps internal contradictions in the space law
regime. As will be seen, just like the space law regime, the application of the U.N. Charter
provisions on the use of force create plenty of middle ground when confronted with the
weaponization of space.

IV. SPACE AND THE UN CHARTER: PEELING A LEGAL ONION?
When the U.N. Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense was the only
included exception (reserved to state discretion) to the general prohibition of the use of force.
Previously, in addition to self-defense, customary international law had accepted reprisal,
retaliation, and retribution as legitimate responses by states whose interests had been injured.
Under the U.N. Charter, unilateral acts of force were not characterized as self-defense, regardless
102
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of motive were made illegal. Individual or collective self-defense became the cornerstone relating
to use of force and since then has been invoked with regard to almost every use of external
military force.
The U.N. Charter, while seeming to present a neat and tidy regime on the use of force,
nonetheless reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a system to govern conventional
warfare. The concept of war as then understood specifically covered conventional warfare and
was premised on the use of aerial, terrestrial and sea spaces. This fact is reflected strongly and
almost exclusively in the existing regime on the law of armed conflict. Few, if any, of the
diplomats, politicians and legal experts during the drafting of the U.N. Charter seem to have
anticipated that in the next several decades technology would advance to a stage where the
militarization and weaponization of space would move from wishful thinking into a possibility
and finally a reality.
The pivot on which present day jus ad bellum hinges is article 2(4) of the Charter, which
articulates the principle of the prohibition of force in international relations. Article 2(4) avoids
term “war.” The use of force in international relations proscribed in the article includes war and
transcends war to cover forcible measures short of war. Though the U.N. Charter forbids the
“threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,”104 the meaning of this
prohibition remains hotly contested.
The reality noted in part II of the article is that despite the space regime being premised
on the basic principle of “peaceful” purposes which at first glance seems to militate against any
sort of militarization or weaponization operations,105 “[o]uter space has achieved the dubious

104
105

U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(4).
Morgan, supra note 101, at 248.

27

distinction of being the most heavily militarized environment accessible to humans.”106 As a
result, there has been tacit, if not explicit, acknowledgment of this reality. When one considers
the Outer Space Treaty, the so-called Magna Carta of outer space, article III of the Outer Space
Treaty provides perhaps the clearest indication that the international law of war will apply to
space warfare.

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including
the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security
and promoting international co-operation and understanding.107

Ramsey notes “[t]his observation provides the strongest evidence that as far as its
principles will apply to future technologies, the law of war has been incorporated into military
space operations by virtue of the Outer Space Treaty.”108 However, this bold assertion is not
black and white. The same provision equally applies to the counter perspective that space should
be a science sanctuary for endeavors geared towards peace not a battleground. This arises from
the fact that the article applies the restrictions of international law to outer space activities.
Considering that the legal regime on the use of force and the law of war are products of
international law, the logical presumption is that it encompasses the pacific theme that lies at the
heart of the U.N. Charter. This is especially so in view of the fact that article III makes specific
reference to the U.N. Charter. This being so, the argument advanced above regarding the tacit
application of the provision to space warfare would not hold much water. However, though the
application of international law to outer space is hemmed in by a pacific theme championing the
interest of maintaining international peace and security, the elastic space regime affords
interpretation one way or the other.
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Sliding further into the legal quagmire, let us consider whether a cyber-attack constitutes
an “armed attack” justifying self-defense within the framework of article 51. Armed attack
clearly implies the use of arms or military force and has an offensive, destructive, and illegal
nature.109 Significant in this regard is the “Definition of Aggression” adopted by the UN General
Assembly through Resolution 3314.110 Article 1 defines aggression as the “use of armed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.”111 To the extent that “non-peaceful” means the aggressive use of force, such uses are
prohibited by the U.N. Charter’s provision to the contrary. Thus, A.S.A.T.s and other S.O.V.s
with the capability to deploy ordnances from space deviate from the non-aggressive character of
satellites, and in so doing may appear to violate the non-aggressive mandate required of all space
activities under the “peaceful purposes” restriction.

This is insofar as a cyber-attack on a State’s commercial satellites is commensurate with the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty of another State (or perhaps, more specifically,
with the use of weapons by a State against the territory of another State) . . . and not justified as
either self-defense or collective security.112

The crux of the matter, though, is that the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit the
transiting, or even the orbiting, of conventional weaponry in space. As Ramsey notes:

The prohibition on orbiting of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, strongly
suggests the distinction between those weapons, and conventional weapons of lesser destructive
power, including those directed at satellites. Though Article IV (1) could easily be modified to
effect the de-weaponization of space, conventional weapons are not proscribed.113
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Professor Ian Brownlie proposes that weapons which do not employ the force of shock
waves and heat associated with more orthodox weapons, may nevertheless be assimilated to the
use of force on two grounds: “In the first place the agencies concerned are commonly referred to
as ‘weapons’ and forms of ‘warfare . . . [and] the second consideration [is] the fact that these
weapons are employed for the destruction of life and property.”114 Thus, though space weapons
were not actively envisaged during the drafting of the U.N. Charter, whether a satellite is struck
by an A.S.A.T. weapon or ordnances are deployed by an S.O.V., under Brownlie’s formulation
this cyber-attack would equate to the use of armed force.115

VI. CONCLUSION
The “peaceful purposes” concept is an accepted axiom of customary international Space
Law and continues to be recognized in the majority of space-related international agreements and
U.N. declarations or resolutions enacted today. Though the term “peaceful” is encapsulated in
virtually all U.N. documents devoted to outer space matters, “[m]ost experts agree, however, that
the Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit “military use” of space. In this regard, Richard A.
Morgan notes that the “peaceful” purposes centerpiece of space law

does not rule out the military use of outer space or military use of commercial communications satellites.
It does not prohibit the use of commercial satellite communications in tactical military operations in which
armed force is used. Whether a military use is for “peaceful purposes” cannot be determined by the type of
vehicle on which a satellite terminal is mounted, by the vehicle’s cargo, by the nature of the
communications traffic, or by whether the vehicle or personnel using the equipment are engaged in
military operations involving the use of armed force. Satellite earth stations need not be “turned-off”
merely because the vehicle on which they are mounted are engaged in an operation involving the use of
armed force.116
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While there is little controversy that “peaceful purposes” applies to outer space activities
controversy comes into play as to what the phrase means. General consensus within the United
Nations points to an understanding of “peaceful”, as more specifically equating to “nonaggressive”. As noted by Qian Jiadong of China during the 1986 Conference on Disarmament:
“Outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of ... mankind. No
country should develop, test or deploy space weapons in any form. An international agreement on
the complete prohibition of space weapons should be concluded through negotiations as soon as
possible.”117 However, controversy arises owing to two divergent views strongly propounded by
the two leading space faring nations and thus the vanguard of the development of customary
international law on the matter—the U.S. and Soviet Union (now Russia, the rump republic of the
former Soviet Union). The original Soviet view was that “peaceful purposes” meant no “military”
use of outer space, a view that they later softened118 as their military satellite programs came to
fruition.119 The Soviets have always claimed that their uses of outer space were “peaceful” and
“scientific”.120 The U.S. view has always been121 that the phrase “peaceful purposes” means
“non-aggressive” use of outer space, a view it has adhered to from the beginning of the space
age.122 Thus, the 1958 U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Act (the statutory basis for the U. S.
national space program)123 requires that U.S. space activities be devoted to “peaceful purposes”,
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while also mandating that these activities contribute to “national defense.”124 It is the national
defense limb that brings into play the U.S. view that in as far as weapons are deployed in space
for purposes of self-defense, this is permissible.125 This stance is at odds with the general
sentiment expressed by many states at the 1986 Conference on Disarmament where it was opined
that the deployment of space weaponry would only serve to fuel a space arms race as major
powers would seek to counter-balance the ability of others to have supremacy in space in the
event that such weaponry was used for combat purposes.126
Considering that states have an obligation, under both the U.N. Charter and the Outer
Space Treaty to use outer space for peaceful purposes, greater emphasis ought to be placed on the
“common interests” language contained in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty. The relevant part
of the Article provides that Outer Space: “shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries,...and shall be the province of all mankind”.127 An emphasis on the “common
interests” would play a prominent role in the re-evaluation and rethinking of the term “peaceful
purposes” and resolve the divergent views noted above between the two leading space faring
nations through the adoption of a “non-military” definition that will eviscerate the “hedging
game” that as prospered and that will inevitably pave the way for a “no-hold barred” approach
once space warfare dawns on mankind.
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The basis for a “non-military” definition is further championed by Professor Bin Cheng.
He draws a tight, cogent analogy between the “peaceful purpose” clause in the Outer Space
Treaty with the identical clause in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 which it mirrors.128 He notes that
a synthesis of the Antarctic Treaty brings to light two important points applicable to interpreting
the Outer Space Treaty clause: “peaceful” means non-military and references to military
installations and maneuvers is not exhaustive but indicative.129
About five decades after research into space weaponry commenced, there is no binding
international instrument limiting the use of such weapons. This has contributed to states’
reluctance to foreclose development of space weapons. With contemporary technological and
engineering breakthroughs, it is increasingly evident that a treaty specifically governing means
and methods of space warfare is necessary, as the current space law regime presents an unclear
and shaky framework. Ramsey notes that an examination of the space law regime discloses that,
at a minimum, the following military activities in outer space are not prohibited:

1. The use of military personnel;
2. The use of space-based remote sensors in support of combat or other military purposes;
3. The use of space-based communication, navigation, and meteorological systems for combat or
other military purposes;
4. The deployment and non-aggressive use of conventional space weapons; and
5. The transiting of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in non-orbital trajectories.130
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The space law regime yields little information on space warfare. Though space
militarization and weaponization, has been actively pursued for decades: “[The law of armed
conflict] is no longer a body of law designed to ensure a fair fight between two opponents...”131
Indeed, it would seem that this is what lies behind the race to space supremacy. One commentator
observes that space law, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, and the Moon Agreement, was developed to “permit, indeed to endorse,
the arms race, including the militarization of space.”132 The prospect of space warfare requires
the formulation of a new perspective on the U.N. Charter regime on the use of force for two
primary reasons. Weaponization of space, which sits uneasily with the “conventional” bias of the
U.N. Charter, will lead to ghosts from the Cold War era coming back to life, in particular the
“counterforce attack” paradigm.133 The problem of destroying ballistic missiles on the ground
before they are launched is widely recognized in military circles as far more tractable than the
difficult challenge of destroying them in flight after launch. With the United States pursuing its
ballistic missile defense shield, it is not impractical to assume that China or Russia will have no
choice but opt for military strikes against counter value targets (enemy cities) rather than against
counterforce targets (enemy missiles) should there be military conflict. Tucked within this
paradigm is the concept of limited deterrence which rests on a war-fighting paradigm aimed at
communicating an ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every rung on the
escalation ladder.
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Along the same spectrum, a broad right of anticipatory self-defense premised on a
standard of “emerging or imminent threat” would gain significant currency. This is so especially
since some scholars believe that a right of truly anticipatory self-defense has emerged outside of
Article 51 in light of the availability of weapons of mass destruction.134 Professor Thomas Franck
accounts for the emergence of a viable doctrine of anticipatory self-defense through, “the
transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant destruction. These
[weapons bring] into question the conditionality of Article 51, which limits states’ exercise of the
right of self-defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first-strike capabilities begat
a doctrine of “anticipatory self-defense.”135 Professor C. Greenwood weighs in with the
observation that in a nuclear age, it is the potentially devastating consequences of prohibiting
self-defense unless an armed attack has already occurred that leads one to prefer the
interpretation permitting anticipatory self-defense.136 The development of such a right is
prompted by potential targets seeking to strike first, to use rather than lose their biological,
chemical, nuclear and space assets. It is not difficult to envisage that this would introduce
dangerous uncertainties relating to the determination of potential threats justifying pre-emptive
action once space weaponization matures. With this determination being state-based the
probability of opportunistic strikes to cripple another state’s military capabilities would be
justified as anticipatory self-defense.
In a presentation before the 354th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament,
Mr. Dhanapala of Sri Lanka discussed the prevention of an arms race in outer space. He stated:
“[W]e must negotiat[e] a treaty or treaties to ban weapons in outer space…If this body confined
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itself merely to the examination of issues relevant to disarmament, we would replace the Tower
of Babel as the symbol of confused confabulation. Our discussions here must not only be
graduated but must also have a sense of direction…”137 In the coming couple of decades, space
warfare may well be a reality; this requires the formulation of a new perspective on the law of
war. There is need for either an entirely international agreement on the complete prohibition of
space weapons or at least the conclusion of a protocol to the outer Space treaty to this effect.138
This will eliminate the need for academicians and practitioners to making educated but uncertain
guesses based on analogies with other legal regimes.139
The need for clear, coherent legal limitations in space is summed up by Colleen D.
Sullivan’s astute observation that despite the fact that customary law, which has evolved in the
last few decades since human-created objects began orbiting the earth and is based on principles
designed to keep weapons out of space, the international community must codify them in treaties
to assure that weapons remain out of the space environment.140 The author concurs
enthusiastically with this observation. After all, this has been the general intent of the
international community, evidenced by countless statements, numerous declarations and
resolutions and the general tenor of the space law regime.
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